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Articles
Monopoly Union Power, Wage,
Competition, and the Labor Antitrust
Exemption: "Which Side Are You
on?
MARK S. PULLIAM**
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed atpreservingfree and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on thepremise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lo west prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same timeproviding an environment conducive to
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition.'
* With apologies to Florence Reece, author of the 1932 union organizing song. Cf.
Modjeska, Current Issues in Labor Law-Foreword" Which Side Are You On?, 41 Ohio St. L.J.
273 (1980).
** Associate, Latham & Watkins. Member, California Bar. B.S., 1977, American Univer-
sity; J.D., 1980, The University of Texas. The views expressed herein are, of course, solely those
of the author.
1. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1956).
Pactfic Law Journal / Vol 13
Workers cannot thrive but can only die under competition between
themselves ... Thus the exercise by workingmen offreedom of as-
semby, to have real meaning, must comprehend the right to eliminate
wage competition between individual employees and to require adher-
ence to the common rule through the device of union membership as a
condition of employment, whereas in the case of business men it will not
include the right to eliminate price competition z
"How much's it want, " Syverson yells, "how much, this flabor] organi-
zation you tell us about."
"Pang it, Syve, all it wants is what's fair-"
"FairI It wants advantage is what."
"Okay! Okay!" Floyd hollered, getting rattled, "but all it wants is its
fair advantage!"3
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most significant domestic policy issue raised during the
1980 presidential campaign was President Reagan's proposal for mean-
ingful labor law reform. President Reagan stated, for example, that we
should "look very closely" at whether American labor unions should be
subject to the federal antitrust laws, just as businesses are.4 Reconsid-
ering organized labor's anomalous exemption from the antitrust laws is
a subject important and complex enough to warrant serious discussion
and analysis. Henry Simons observed long ago that "[qluestioning the
virtues of the organized labor movement is like attacking religion, mo-
nogamy, motherhood, or the home. Among the modem intelligentsia
any doubts about collective bargaining admit of explanation only in
terms of insanity, knavery, or subservience to 'the interests.' -' By ex-
2. Brief for Appellants, American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S.
538 (1949), quoted in G. BRIEFS, UNION REAPPRAISED: FROM CLASSICAL UNIONISM TO UNION
ESTABLISHMENT 30 (1960).
3. K. KESEY, SOMETIMES A GREAT NOTION 102 (1972).
4. 'Washington Post, April 23, 1980, §A, at 12, col. 1. This statement, like President Rea-
gan's prescient observation that fascism served as the conceptual model for the New Deal, shows a
remarkably keen understanding of economic theory. See H. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A
FREE SOCIETY 91-92 (1948); Petro, Civil Liberty, Syndicalism, and the NLRA, 5 U. TOL. L. REV.
447, 448-49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Petrol; Kraus, "Reagan's Comments on Fascism and the
New Deal," Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1980, at 32, col. 4.
5. Simons, Some Refiections on Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (1944) [hereinafter cited
as Simons]. President Reagan's pledge to re-examine organized labor's long-standing exemption
from the antitrust laws and his advocacy of a differential minimum wage for youths prompted
harsh denunciations from union leaders such as United Auto Workers president and Chrysler
Corporation board member Douglas Fraser. The AFL-CIO "sent out nearly 100 million pieces of
[campaign] literature denouncing Reagan as a foe of workers." Los Angeles Times, Oct. 25, 1980,
§1, at 30, col. 3. Jerry Wurf, president of the one-million-member American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, called Reagan "a real enemy of labor." 1d
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ploring the evolution and underlying policy of the federal antitrust
laws and their application to organized labor, this article will try to
inject some much-needed skepticism into an area of law whose major
premises are seldom challenged. The nature and effect of trade union-
ism as it exists under the National Labor Relations Act6 (hereinafter
referred to as NLRA), particularly the doctrines of collective bargain-
ing and exclusive representation, will be critically examined. Analyz-
ing these doctrines and the labor antitrust exemption in terms of
economics, law, and logic, this article concludes that the extension of
the Sherman Act to labor unions (or the functionally equivalent course
of repealing those provisions of the NLRA which prescribe exclusive
representation) is desirable and long overdue.
ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY
The federal antitrust laws-the 1890 Sherman Act7 and the 1914
Clayton Act--embody the classic laissez-faire principle that unre-
strained competition among sellers will produce the optimal (ie. equi-
librium) price for any particular commodity.9 In a competitive market
the most profitable level of output is the one at which the individual
seller's marginal cost (ie., the fixed and variable costs of producing a
single additional unit) is equal to market price. 10 Therefore, the price
6. The current NLRA, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§151-69 (1976 & Supp. I 1979), was enacted
as the Wagner Act in 1935 and twice has been significantly amended, by the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959. For excellent analyses of how the National Labor
Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as NLRB) has systematically frustrated and ignored the
congressional mandates of Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin, see generally S. PETRO, How THE
NLRB REPEALED TAFT-HARTLEY (1958); Petro, Labor Relations Law, 1966 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
247; Petro, The NLRB versus the National Labor Policy, 1968 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 247; Petro,
Expertise, the NLRB, and the Constitution: Things 4bused and Things Forgotten, 14 WAYNE L.
REV. 1126 (1968). The Supreme Court's unfortunate endorsement of egregious NLRB decisions
negating congressional policy is cogently criticized in Petro, The Supreme Court versus the National
Labor Policy, 1969-70 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 533. For a brilliant indictment of the NLRA itself, on
libertarian and common law grounds, see generally Petro, supra note 4. The reader would be
correct in surmising that Professor Sylvester Petro has contributed the bulk of the scholarly litera-
ture in this area. For citations to additional publications by Professor Petro-which the serious
reader is encouraged to peruse--see notes 34, 61, 73, 111 and 112 infra.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§41-44 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), the third piece of basic antitrust legislation, is neither
implicated by, nor particularly germane to, the dialectic between antitrust and labor policy.
9. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Market price, the
Supreme Court has said, is the "central nervous system of the economy." United States v. So-
cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940). Because market-determined competitive
pricing is considered so important a social good, "interference with the setting of price by free
market forces is unlawfulper se." United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
"The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition."
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951). In fact, Justice Douglas once described the
Sherman Act, which enshrines the philosophy of free and unfettered competition, as a "charter of
freedom." 310 U.S. at 221. See also National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975).
10. See R. DORFMAN, PICES AND MARKETS 52 (3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DoRF-
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 13
of a product sold in a competitive market tends to be equal to the mar-
ginal cost of producing the product." Competition among sellers,
which is fostered and protected by the antitrust laws,' 2 leads to the
most economically efficient (pareto optimal) allocation of goods; the
price (marginal cost) of a product in a competitive market reflects its
true social cost or utility, te., the demand value of the things that could
have been produced with the resources it consumed.'" Consumer sov-
ereignty-the ability of a consumer to purchase what he desires in the
type and amount he desires-is the simple obverse of the fundamental
economic tenet that the concepts of "value" and "worth" are meaning-
less except as expressions of the market choices of uncoerced buyers."4
Monopolies, price-fixing agreements, and other artificial restraints of
competition are economically undesirable and wasteful because the
monopolist, insulated from the competitive rigors of the market, will
restrict his output and raise his price above the "normal" or equilib-
rium level. 5 Monopoly injures the consuming public by creating
higher prices and poorer quality than a competitive market would per-
mit.' 6 The exercise of monopoly power, by distorting the expression of
consumer preferences in the market, results in a misallocation of re-
sources and a transfer of income from consumers to the monopolist-
producer.' 7
To prevent (or at least minimize) the deleterious economic effects of
monopoly or impaired competition, section 1 of the Sherman Act pro-
vides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, . . . is declared to be illegal."' 8 Section 2 of the Sher-
MAN]; Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 551-52 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Posner].
11. See DORFMAN, supra note 10, at 55. See generally Posner, supra note 10, at 550, 557.
12. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
13. See DORFMAN, supra note 10, at 155.
14. It is necessary in the first instance that the parties in the market should be free to sell
and buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction and that anybody
should be free to produce, sell, and buy anything that may be produced or sold at all.
And it is essential that the entry into the different trades should be open to all on equal
terms and that the law should not tolerate any attempts by individuals or groups to
restrict this entry by open or concealed force. Any attempt to control prices or quantities
of particular commodities deprives competition of its power of bringing about an effec-
tive co-ordination of individual efforts, because price changes then cease to register all
the relevant changes in circumstances and no longer provide a reliable guide for the
individual's actions.
F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 37 (1944).
15. See DORFMAN, supra note 10, at 147-56; Posner, supra note 10, at 552 n.6.
16. See generally E. GELLHORN, ANtITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 11, 87-102 (1976); Pos-
ner, The Social Costs of Monopol, and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975).
17. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND Eco-
NOMICS 4-7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ELZINGA & BREIT]; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 400-04 (1970); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 78-81 (3d ed.
1966).
18. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1976).
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man Act forbids the monopolization or attempt to monopolize "any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 19 The Clay-
ton Act, which was enacted 24 years after the Sherman Act, proscribes
price discrimination, 20 tying and exclusive dealing contracts,21 and cor-
porate mergers when the effect of these practices may be "substantially
to lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce."2 2 To underscore the vital importance of competition as an
economic and social good, the antitrust laws carry severe sanctions. Vi-
olations of the antitrust laws are felonies and may be punished by up to
three years' imprisonment, flues of up to $1 million, and drastic civil
liabilities.23
LABOR UNIONS AND COMPETITION
There is no articulable economic or philosophic basis (except in
Marxian-syndicalist ideology) for distinguishing labor from any other
commodity bought and sold in the market.24 As long as the purchasers
of labor (employers) do not form cartels known as monopsonies, which,
19. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
20. See 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1976).
21. See 15 U.S.C. §14 (1976).
22. See 15 U.S.C. §18 (1976).
23. See 15 U.S.C. §§1-3, 15 (1976).
24. In a bold recent article, economist Morgan 0. Reynolds argues that "unions act in accord
with the conventional cartel or monopoly model." Reynolds, Whafever Happenedto the Monopoly
Theory of Labor Unions? 2 J. LABOR RESEARCH 163, 163 (1981); see text accompanying notes 15-
17 supra. To the traditional criticism that there is no "marginal cost" of union labor which is
analogous to a firm's production cost, Reynolds responds: "The answer lies in the fundamental
notion of cost: the marginal cost of the union labor supply is the opportunity cost of employees
represented by the union." Reynolds, supra, at 164. Professor Reynolds' economic analysis con-
cludes:
Unions negotiate wage rates which maximize the monetary surplus above the supply
price of labor. The analysis implies that (I) union wage rates are in elastic regions of
demand; (2) union wage rates are positively related to nonunion wage rates despite
ceteris paribus declines in union employment and declines in the union-non-union wage
differential; (3) both union wages and union employment vary positively with shifts in
demand for union labor, with relative proportions depending upon the demand elastic-
ity. Evidence about these predictions for labor unions is currently weak or nonexistent
because the conventional theory of monopoly has been mistakenly ignored, especially by
labor economists.
Id at 171.
Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Labor Committee, has written:
From an economic point of view, labor is a commodity, and wages are the price of that
commodity... . If wages are low, and employers are making high profits, other em-
ployers will move in, increasing the demand for labor. Employers will bid against each
other for workers, and wages will move up. . . . In a vast economy like that of the
United States, it is impossible to suppress, indefinitely, the effects of supply and demand.
The most the labor unions can do is to act as a cartel, artificially exaggerating the price of
labor at one point in the system, at the expense of some other point.
Hatch, Labor.' Promoting Freedom in the Workplace, in A CHANGING AMEICA 63-64 (P. Laxalt
& R. Williamson eds. 1980).
The rhetoric of classical trade unionism posits, inter alia, that the labor of a human being is
intrisically unique and that sellers of labor should be entitled to form cartels in order to obtain a
higher price. This peculiar theory of price determination, obviously contravening our nation's
commitment to the ideal of market competition, is discussed in text accompanying notes 69-75
infra.
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just like monopolies, are economically undesirable as distortions of the
market, the competition among sellers of labor (workers) will result in
the optimal, most allocatively efficient wage and employment levels.
Significantly, monopsony behavior among buyers is illegalper se under
the antitrust laws if it has the purpose and effect, or contributes to the
effect, of depressing, lowering, fixing, or stabilizing the price of a com-
modity sold in interstate commerce.
Prior to the introduction of labor unions into a competitive labor
market, purchasers can negotiate and contract with each unique seller,
according to the buyer's own unique requirements and preferences.
Sellers of more productive, better-trained, or more experienced labor
can demand a higher price than their average quality counterparts.
The seller of marginal quality labor will be unable to sell his services
except at a marginal wage rate (although, importantly, there will al-
ways be a buyer at a low enough price).
Labor unions dramatically alter the market processes. Perhaps the
most distinctive and pernicious feature of collective bargaining by "la-
bor organizations" under the NLRA is exclusivity of representation;
after a majority of voting employees in an "appropriate unit" have
elected to be represented by a union, the employer may no longer bar-
gain or contract with any of the individual employees-even the minor-
ity (possibly 49 percent) who rejected the union-but can negotiate
only with the union representative on behalf of the entire unit.2 6 A
corollary of the collectivization of the employment "bargain" is that
individual employees with superior industry, skill, or experience may
no longer negotiate a superior rate of compensation. Rather, each em-
ployee in the unit is paid at a uniform rate determined to be "fair" and
in the best interests of the group. The Supreme Court made the mean-
ing of the NLRA very clear in JL Case Co. v. NLRB,27 when it stated:
25. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940). "Any combina-
tion which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity.... [Congress] has
not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to
price-fixing conspiracies." Id at 221. Agreements between competitors who refuse to buy from
specified sources or who attempt to affect in any way the market price through monopsonistic or
oligopsonistic cartels are violations of the antitrust laws. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948). See generally Eastern States Retail Lum-
ber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609-14 (1914).
26. See Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(5), 159(a); R. GORMAN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 374-81 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as GORMAN]. Professor Petro has noted that
[a]lthough the National Labor Relations Act was in 1935--and continues to be in 1974-
an infringement of the contract rights of employers and employees in many other re-
spects, the feature of the Labor Act which constitutes its gravest impairment of personal
freedom, and at the same time its most obvious endorsement of the principle of the
corporative state, lies in its imposition of compulsory collective bargaining.
Petro, supra note 4, at 450.
27. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement
is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with
terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the
welfare of the group.
...The practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks
[sic] with suspicion on. . .individual advantages.28
In the guise of employee "solidarity" and "industrial democracy,"
wage competition and a good deal of individual freedom are elimi-
nated under collective bargaining.
More than any other aspect of protected "concerted activity" under
Section 7 of the NLRA-such as "union security" agreements, strikes,
picketing, and other forms oforganized boycott (though these devices
greatly magnify union power)-the core notion of exclusive representa-
tion confers upon labor unions legal monopoly status.29 Sections
8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA forbid individual bargaining and wage
competition among workers in favor of compulsory collective bargain-
ing between employer and union. Labor scholar and union advocate
Theodore St. Antoine blithely admits that "[a]ccording to classical
trade union theory, the objective is the elimination of wage competition
28. Id at 338. "The meaning of J.L Case is unmistakable: rewards that derive from talent,
experience and effort cannot be retained by the individual but must be yielded to the collectivity
... " P. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO UNION POWER 8 (1976). For an eerily plausi-
ble vision of an egalitarian future in which equality is achieved by enforcing a norm of mediocrity,
see K. Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE (1968). Alexis de
Tocqueville, anticipating our present fetish for end-result equality, observed long ago that "there
exists... in the human heart a depraved taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to
lower the powerful to their own level, and reduces men to prefer equality in slavery to inequality
with freedom." I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 67-68 (F. Bowen ed., 2d ed.
1863). Milton and Rose Friedman develop this theme-vitally important to a (yet) free society-
in their lucid and forceful volume, FREE TO CHOOSE (1979), at 128-49 [hereinafter cited as FRIED-
MAN & FRIEDMAN]. See also Flew, "hat is a Right?, 13 GA. L. REv. 1117, 1132 (1979).
29. Staaf & West, Agency Shops and the Public Sector: An Economic Analysis, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 645, 655-57 (1979) (exclusive representation gives unions monopoly power over the em-
ploying firm's workforce or potential labor pool). This article also fashions an economic refuta-
tion of the assumptions supporting conventional "free rider" arguments in favor of exclusive
representation. See Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1186-88 (1980)
("When a union obtains [a collective-bargaining] agreement from a firm, it has monopolized the
labor supply."). Professor Leslie's acceptance of the NLRA as a given forces him to conclude that
"[u]nion monopolization of the labor supply is not an antitrust violation." Id at 1234. Because I
believe the NLRA is fallacious and incompatible with a free society, I cannot join Professor Les-
lie's sanguine conclusion. See notes 88, 93 infra. That many "conservative" establishment figures
share Professor Leslie's assumption is truly mystifying. Devotees of capitalism and a free society
should decry the economic distortion and coercion inherent in collective bargaining--the carte-
lization of the labor market. In addition to their direct social and economic costs, devices such as
collective bargaining tend to obscure, in the public mind and attitudinal ethos, the sanctity and
primacy of laissezfaire competitive institutions, thus contributing to the crippling regulatory tide
which currently enmires our economy. Compare Kosters, On Saving the Kingdom: Labor Regula-
tion, REGULATION (Nov.-Dec. 1980) at 30 ("recognizing" the legitimacy, "maturity," and con-
structive role of collective labor bargaining), with Petro, supra note 4, at 448-49; Simons, supra
note 5, at 1. See generally G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1980); T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE
AND DECISIONS 167-228 (1980); see note 24 supra.
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among all employees doing the same job in the same industry. 3 °
Professors Richard Freeman and James Medoff point out that:
[e]conomists today generally treat unions as monopolies whose sole
function is to raise wages. Since monopolistic wage increases are so-
cially deleterious-in that they can be expected to induce both ineffi-
ciency and inequality-most economic studies implicitly or explicitlyjudge unions as having a negative impact on the economy.3
Even the New York Times has recognized that: "American unions
are legal monopolies which increase members' wages largely at the ex-
pense of the 80 percent of the work force that is not organized. 32 The
monopoly effect of reducing output, ie., the number of jobs, is also
evident in unionized labor markets. Professor Edward Banfield notes,
with his customary clarity, that "by forcing the price of low-productiv-
ity (and other) labor above the value of labor to employers, unions
cause less of it to be employed. 33 One consequence of worker "soli-
darity" and union-supported minimum wage legislation, then, is the
chronic unemployment of their less-educated, less-experienced com-
rades. 34 Professor Banfield suggests that
the way to solve the employment problem in the city is to allow the
price of all labor, including the least valuable, to fall to a level at
which it will be purchased .... The point is that low-value labor
must be priced no higher than it is worth if those who can use it are
to have an incentive to do so. 35
30. St. Antoine, Connell Antitrust Law at the Expense ofLabor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 604
(1976) [hereinafter cited as St. Antoine].
31. Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, PUBLIC INTEREST (Fall 1979) 69, 70.
Accord, G. BRIEFS, UNIONISM REAPPRAISED: FROM CLASSICAL UNIONISM TO UNION ESTAB-
LISHMENT (1960); FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 228-47; H. HAZLITt, THE CONQUEST
OF POVERTY 141 (1973); A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 87-88, 186, 188 (2d ed.
1977); Chamberlin, The Economic Analyis ofLabor Union Power, in LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 1 (American Enterprise Ass'n ed. 1958); Petro, supra note 4, at 481-86; Simons, supra note
5.
32. Editorial, For, andAgainst, Unions, New York Times, Sept. 1, 1980, §A, at 12, col. 1.
Accord, C. BAIRD, UNIONISM AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 13-14 (1978); H.G. LEWIS, UNIONS AND
RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (1963); Chrisman, Antitrust, Price Structures, and La-
bor- Union Power in the Olgopoly Industries, 4 ANTITRUST LAW & ECON. REV. 47, 52-55 (1971).
33. E. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF OUR URBAN
CRISIS 97 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BANFIELD]; see Workers Grioe About Extra Load Caused by
New 'Combination'Jobs, Wall St. J. Sept. 9, 1980, at 35, col. 3.
34. See BANFIELD, supra note 33, at 95-99. The economic evidence is overwhelming. See B.
FLEISHER, MINIMUM WAGE REGULATION IN RETAIL TRADE (1981); D. PARSONS, POVERTY AND
THE MINIMUM WAGE (1981); F. WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE (1978);
Brozen, The Effect of Statutory Minimum Wage Increases on Teen-Age Unemployment, 12 J. LAW
& ECON. 109 (1969); McKenzie, The Labor Market Effects of Minimum Wage Laws: A New Per-
spective, I J. LABOR RESEARCH 255 (1980); Mincer, Unemployment Effects ofMinimum Wages, 84
J. POL. ECON. 587 (1976).
35. BANFIELD, supra note 33, at 103. See generally FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 28,
at 22847.
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LABOR UNIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
We have seen, thus far, why the exercise of monopoly power is so-
cially and economically undesirable. We have briefly reviewed the an-
titrust laws' longstanding proscription of monopoly and otherwise anti-
competitive conduct. We have ascertained that labor unions, as they
currently exist under the NLRA, are monopoly organizations with all
of the objectionable effects of monopolies. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the common law originally treated the concerted, coercive
activities of labor unions as criminal conspiracies. 36
A. The Common Law Response to Trade Unionism
The development and application of various legal doctrines, espe-
cially the law of conspiracy and the use of the injunction, to various
labor union activities by common law courts is a subject that scholars
have explored at some length.37 The limited focus of this article has
been the features of the NLRA which confer upon labor unions the
right of exclusive representation and impose on employers the duty of
compulsory collective bargaining. The common law response to these
specific aspects of union behavior was clear and understandably harsh.
Attempts by labor organizations to raise wages via the concerted agree-
ment of workmen were punished as criminal conspiracies. This posi-
36. See St. Antoine, supra note 30, at 604; notes 37-46 and accompanying text infra. "Ameri-
can common law had its origin in British law, which emphasized the freedom of individuals to
make contracts, the inviolability of the law of supply and demand, and the illegality of combina-
tions in restraint of trade." A. BLUM, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 17
(1972). In Old Dominion Steam-Ship Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. 48, 50 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887), Judge
Brown summarized the law:
All combinations and associations designed to coerce workmen to become members, or
to interfere with, obstruct, vex, or annoy them in working, or in obtainng work, because
they are not members, or in order to induce them to become members; or designed to
prevent employers from making a just discrimination in the rate of wages paid to the
skillful and to the unskillful; to the diligent and to the lazy; to the efficient and to the
inefficient;... by means of threats of injury or loss, by interference with [employers']
property or traffic, or with their lawful employment of other persons, or designed to
abridge any of these rights,-arepro tanto illegal combinations or associations; and all
acts done in furtherance of such intentions by such means, and accompanied by damage,
are actionable.
Seealso Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336,94 N.E. 316 (1911); Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353,74
N.E. 603 (1905); Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900).
37. The legal-historical literature is voluminous. See, eg., Bonnett, The Origin of the Labor
Injunction, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. 105 (193 1); Forkosch, he Doctrine of Criminal Conspiracy and Its
Modern Application to Labor (pts. 1-2), 40 TEXAS L. REv. 303, 473 (1962); Nelles, he First Ameri-
can Labor Case, 41 YALE LJ. 165 (1931); Sultan, Historical Antecedents to the Right-to- Work
Controversy, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (1958); Witte, EarlyAmerican Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825
(1926). The most comprehensive and penetrating of the historical-legal studies, however, is Petro,
Injunctions andLabor-Disputes: 1880-1932-Part I What the Courts Actually Did-and Why, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Injunctions and Labor Disputes]. Also
excellent is T. HAGGARD, COMPUSLORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTs: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS ch. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HAGGARD] re-
viewed by Vieira, 29 S.C. L. REV. 437 (1978).
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tion was later modified to hold that while agreements to fix wages
among willing workmen were not unlawful, attempts to enforce such
agreements against unwilling workmen were punishable as criminal
conspiracies. A pair of nineteenth century American cases illustrate the
law nicely.
In an 1835 New York conspiracy case, People v. Fisher,3" Chief Jus-
tice Savage stated that
[workmen] may each singly refuse to work unless they receive an
advance of wages, but if they do so by preconcert or association, they
may be punished for a conspiracy. Such was the construction of the
common law .... 39
The law reflected the importance of wage and product competition.
[T]he price of labor or the wages of mechanics will be regulated by
the demand for the manufactured article. . . . [T]he right does not
exist either to enhance the price of the article, or the wages of the
mechanic, by any forced and artificial means.40
A worker may set the price at which he will labor individually, "but he
has no right to say that no other mechanic shall make /bootsjfor less."'4 I
Chief Justice Savage extolled the virtues of market principles and wage
competition in ringing words: "[A]n industrious man was driven out of
employment by unlawful measures pursued by the defendants, and an
injury done to the community, by diminishing the quantity of produc-
tive labor, and of internal trade."42 In short, agreements among work-
ers to fix the price of labor "would be a monopoly of the most odious
kind. '
43
38. 14 Wend. 9 (Sup. Ct. 1835).
39. Id at 16 [citation omitted]. Professor Petro's exhaustive survey of 524 reported and 145
unreported labor cases concludes that at least in doctrinal application of the common law, the
mere voluntary, concerted agreement or conduct of workmen was not punished or enjoined as a
conspiracy in restraint of trade. The legal and equitable touchstone in American labor disputes
from 1880 to 1932, Petro's study reveals, was the use of violence, force, or coercion to impose
concerted agreements against unwilling employers or employees. See Injunction and Labor Dis-
putes, supra note 37, at 446-71. Professor Petro's authoritative analysis refutes the assumption,
spawned by Felix Frankfurter's and Nathan Greene's tract THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930)-that
American common law courts abused their equitable powers in resolving early labor disputes.
Thus, the Norris-LaGuardia Act's withdrawal of injunctive jurisdiction from the federal courts in
labor disputes rests on erroneous historical-empirical premises. See In iunction and Labor Dis-
pute, supra note 37, at 344-45, 377-78; Vieira, Book Review, 5 LAW & LIBERTY 1 (1980); text
accompanying note 62 infra.
40. 14 Wend. at 18.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id
43. Id at 19. Justice Field prophetically observed over a century ago that
[i]f exclusive [occupational] privileges of this character can be granted to a corporation of
seventeen persons, they may, in the discretion of the legislature, be equally granted to a
single individual. If they may be granted for twenty-five years they may be equally
granted for a century, and in perpetuity. If they may be granted for the landing and
keeping of animals intended for sale or slaughter they may be equally granted for the
landing and storing of grain and other products of the earth, or for any article of com-
merce. If they may be granted for structures in which animal food is prepared for mar-
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By the late nineteenth century, the law of conspiracy had relaxed
somewhat. In People v. Wilzig,' an 1886 extortion case, Judge Barrett
explained the evolution:
Formerly a conspiracy of workingmen to raise the rate of wages was
criminally condemned as an act injurious to trade or commerce. But,
now, it has been legislatively decreed that the orderly and peaceable
assembling or co-operation of persons employed in any calling, trade
or handicraft, for the purpose of obtaining an advance in the rate of
wages... is not a conspiracy. This is what laboring men may law-
fully do. What they may not do is to combine togetherfor thepurpose
ofpreventing other people from working at prices to suit themselves.45
Thus, while workingmen could voluntarily organize, they could not co-
erce others and impose collective bargaining or closed shops on uncon-
senting workers. Judge Barrett's eloquent rendition of the common law
rule contrasts rather ironically with sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the
NLRA:
[A]Ithough [a worker] has the right to combine for the purpose of
obtaining an advance in the rate of wages, he has no right to combine
for the purpose of preventing others from exercising their lawful call-
ings, or from working as they please. The law does not, as yet, per-
mit such a combination as that, and I apprehend it will be a long
time before any Legislature can be induced to legalize combinations
for purposes so contrary to the genius of our people, and to the fun-
damental principle of our government.46
ket they may be equally granted for structures in which farinaceous or vegetable food is
prepared. They may be granted for any of the pursuits of human industry, even in its
most simple and common forms. Indeed, upon the theory on which the exclusive Privileges
granted by the act in question are sustained [ie, economic regulation for the "common
good"], there is no monopoly, in the most odiousform, which may not be upheld.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 89 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
44. 4 N.Y. Crim. (1886).
45. Id at 413 (emphasis added).
46. Id at 417. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1917), the
Supreme Court held that
[tihe same liberty which enables men to form unions, and the union to enter into agree-
ments with employers willing to agree, entitles other men to remain independent of the
union and other employers to agree with them to employ no man who owes allegiance or
obligation to the union.
See generally Petro, supra note 4.
Unfortunately, such legislation "contrary to the genius of our people, and to the fundamental
principle of our government"-the NLRA-was not long in coming. And, following President
Roosevelt's threat to "pack" the Supreme Court, the justices of that Court obligingly rubber-
stamped the epochal New Deal legislation. Compare Adair v. United States, 208 LV.. 161, 172-80
(1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13-21 (1915) and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 554-
59 (1934) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I,
43-46 (1937) and J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336-39 (1944). See generally B. SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); Vieira, Rights andthe United States Consti-
tution: The Declension From Natural Law to Legal Positivism, 13 GA. L. REv. 1447, 1475-1500
(1979).
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B. The Antitrust Response
Consonant with this spirit of the law, when Congress enacted the
Sherman Act in 1890, declaring, for the first time, that monopolies are
violations of federal law, it refused to adopt a provision specifically
exempting labor organizations.4 7 Hence, in the early days of the Sher-
man Act, unions were fully subject to the antitrust laws and union lead-
ers were sued,48 enjoined,49 and criminally prosecuted50 under the law.
In Loewe v. Lawlor"' the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act
applied to any unlawful combination in restraint of trade. "The combi-
nation [of labor] charged," the Court said, "falls within the class of
restraint of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers invol-
untarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that
the combination imposes . *. .. , Combinations of labor which im-
pair competition and restrain trade, the Court correctly held, violated
the antitrust laws just as surely as combinations of capital in restraint of
trade.5 3
In 1914, however, the law was dramatically transformed. The centu-
ries-old common law rule and a whole body of case law developed
under the Sherman Act were reversed with an unprecedented legisla-
tive stroke. After Loewe v. Lawlor in 1908, organized labor retrenched,
generated nation-wide grassroots political pressure, and lobbied in-
tensely for an exemption from the federal antitrust laws.54 Union polit-
ical efforts were successful; organized labor had two provisions-
47. S. GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR 251 (rev. ed. P. Taft & J. Sessions
1957) [hereinafter cited as GOMPERS].
48. See, e.g., Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
49. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); United States v.
Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. II. 1894), a~f'dsub nom. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Thomas v.
Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 62 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894); United States v. Workingmen's
Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D. La.), a f'd, 57 Fed. 85 (5th Cir. 1893). See generally
Injunction and Labor Disputes, supra note 37.
50. [F]rom 1890 to 1940--the first fifty years of Sherman Act enforcement-there were
24 cases involving jail sentences out of 252 criminal prosecutions. (13 of these cases
involved trade union leaders.)
ELZiNGA & BREIT, supra note 14, at 31.
51. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
52. Id at 294. Accord, 221 U.S. at 438-39 (while voluntary combinations of labor are not
unlawful per se, they become unlawful when they seek to coerce unconsenting participants, in
restraint of competition); 54 Fed. at 1000 (restraint of trade occurs when a group of workmen
attempt to dictate the wage of an unconsenting worker, citing People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 18 (Sup.
Ct. 1835).
53. 208 U.S. at 292.
54. See F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 199-207 (1949); GOMPERS, supra note 47, at 226-34,
244-59. In an insightful article that analyzes antitrust litigation and enforcement as an industry,
Robert Reich recognizes that monopolists can be expected to seek legal immunities in order to
preserve their monopoly "rent." See Reich, The Antitrust Industry, 68 GEo. L.J. 1053, 1059
(1980). "Larger enterprises can be expected to seek antitrust immunity up to the point that the
expected cost of establishing and enforcing an output-restricting agreement or of deterring new
entry, added to the marginal cost of obtaining the antitrust immunity, equals the expected monop-
oly profits." Id Among other groups, Mr. Reich states, "labor unions... have purchased Ilegis-
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sections 6 and 20-inserted in the 1914 Clayton Act, which Samuel
Gompers hailed as the "Magna Carta" of labor, attempting to exclude
labor organizations from the antitrust laws. The provisions sought to
remove trade union activities, such as the elimination of wage competi-
tion (achieved, prior to the NLRA's creation of exclusive representa-
tion, through the mechanism of the closed shop55), picketing, and
boycotts, from the coverage of the antitrust laws.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act56 provides in part that:
[t]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of com-
merce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor. . .organizations ... or
to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade ....
Section 20 of the Clayton Act 7 limited the power of federal courts to
grant injunctions in labor disputes and listed certain labor activities,
such as striking and picketing, which should not be held to violate the
antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court delineated the contours of the Clayton Act, as it
applied to labor activities, in Duplex Co. v. Deering." Even after the
legislative exemption created by sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act,
the Court held, the antitrust laws prohibited the union's use of the sec-
ondary boycott device in order to secure a closed shop agreement with
an unwilling employer. The Court emphasized, however, that section 6
assumes the normal objects of a labor organization to be legitimate,
and declares that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of such organizations or to forbid
their members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects; and
lative] immunities from antitrust [liability]," citing section 6 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Id at 1060 & n.25.
55. Professor Thomas R. Haggard explains:
Typically... early trade unionists would.., demand that the employer only hire
actual or de facto members of their union-fe., persons who would either join the union
or at least agree to work only at the union-sanctioned wage rate and to comply otherwise
with the union's internal rules and regulations. Thus, it has been said that "these cases
turned upon the important question known today as the 'open' or 'closed shop,' that is,
the refusal to work with nonunion men."
HAGGARD, supra note 37, at 12; see note 60 infra.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the closed shop movement gained momen-
tum. Thirteen cases reached the higher courts regarding the validity of union strike ac-
tion to enforce closed shop demands and in the bulk of these, the closed shop was found
to be either criminal or tortious.
Sultan, Historical Antecedents to the R'ght-to- Work Controversy, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 221, 228
(1958).
56. 15 U.S.C. §17 (1976).
57. 29 U.S.C. §52 (1976).
58. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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that such an organization shall not be held in itself-merely because
of its existence and operation-to be an illegal combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade.59
The Court implicitly approved "legitimate" and "normal" union ob-
jects such as primary picketing and the closed shop agreement (the pre-
NLRA equivalent of exclusive representation6 0 ), while refusing to tol-
erate the coercive means of secondary boycott activity. The elimina-
tion of wage competition inherent in the closed shop, and later in
sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the NLRA, was exempted from the antitrust
laws by the Clayton Act. The unions, however, were not satisfied, and
sought further legislative immunities. Again, union political efforts
were successful. The 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act6' limited the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts to grant injunctions in "labor disputes," which
were broadly defined to include most concerted employee and union
activities. The Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts thus grant antitrust
and other legal immunities to a broad range of union conduct that
would otherwise (and quite properly) be unlawful and enjoinable
under federal law.62
The long and tortuous history of the labor exemption since 1914 has
59. Id at 469 (emphasis in original).
60. Because prior to 1930, collective agreements had no binding effect per se on individual
employees, see Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lapin, 247 N.Y. 65, 159 N.E. 863 (1928); Rice,
Collective Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 572, 582 & n.38 (1931), collective
agreements between union and employer were binding, if at all, on the basis of agency, i£e., on
employees who were members of the union, see Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225, 228-29 (6th
Cir. 1909). See also Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished From Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 753
(1918); Petro, supra note 4, at 452-59, 472-82.
61. 29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1976). Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §106
(1976), exempts an officer or member of, or the labor organization itself, of responsibility for any
unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents except upon clear proof of actual partici-
pation in or authorization of the acts. Section 6 thus emasculates the entire conspiracy doctrine as
it applies to union conduct. For a compelling argument that Section 6 ought to be repealed, see
Comment, Section 6 ofthe Norris-LaGuardia Act: A Statute Whose Time Has Come and Gone, 3
George Mason U. L. Rev. 207 (1980).
62. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 723 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as SULLIVAN]. See generaly Injunction and Labor Disputes, supra note 37.
As a paradoxical result of the labor antitrust exemption,
should a number of businessmen get together to allocate markets or fix prices, the busi-
nessmen can wind up in jail. But when. . . labor officials do the very same thing, as
indeed they do,. . . in virtually every organized labor market, their actions are consid-
ered praiseworthy, in the best of the liberal tradition.
M.B. PETERSON, THE REGULATED CONSUMER 62 (1971). In the Alice in Wonderland world of
federal labor policy,
competition is considered good and monopoly bad in business dealings in goods and
services--save in one type of service-labor. For labor services, competition is consid-
ered bad and monopoly good. Trade unions can legally do almost the same things that
for business firms are forbidden. Unions are allowed and indeed encouraged to monop-
olize regional industry, or occupational job markets, to get together and fix job prices for
crafts and whole industries-and, if need be, to shut down whole industries by industry-
wide strikes.
Id at 101-02. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
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been recounted elsewhere and need not be repeated here.6 3 Suffice it to
say that the Supreme Court has consistently held, at least since Duplex
Co. v. Deering in 1921, that the Sherman Act does not apply to the
price-fixing and elimination of wage competition inherent in collective
labor agreements. 4 In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader65 the Supreme
Court posited that while "[a] combination of employees necessarily re-
strains competition among themselves in the sale of their services to the
employer,"66 Section 6 of the Clayton Act compels the conclusion that
"restraints on the sale of the employee's services to the employer, how-
ever much they curtail the competition among employees, are not...
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade ... 67
"[An elimination of price competition based on differences in labor
standards," the Court intoned, "is the objective of any national labor
organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to
be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sher-
man Act."68
63. See, e.g., GoRMAN, supra note 26, at 621-38; SULLIVAN, supra note 62, at 723-3 1; King &
Smith, Labor Relations andAntitrust: Deveiopments After Connell, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 605 (1979);
Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659
(1965); Smith, Antitrust and Labor, 53 MICH. L. REv. 1119 (1955); St. Antoine, supra note 30;
Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union
Activities, 73 YALE LJ. 14 (1963).
64. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495-503 (1940). The rationale of United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), enlarged the exemption to cover all monopoly conduct
by a union acting alone and in its own behalf. The later cases of United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965),Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) deal with the peripheral and
more eclectic antitrust issues of multiple unit or "industry-wide" bargaining, union demands af-
fectingproduct competition, and prevasively anti-competitive ("hot cargo") agreements to boycott
nonunion subcontractors. See generally Petro, Unions, Housing Costs, and the National Labor Pol-
icy, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 319 (1967).
All of these issues, it seems to me, derive from and are incidental to the initial grant to unions of
legal monopoly power through the NLRA doctrines of exclusive representation and compulsory
collective bargaining, and the Clayton Act's antitrust exemption. Were this unwarranted antitrust
privilege withdrawn, many secondary union abuses would be halted. Conversely, focusing energy
and attention on the manifestations of monopoly union power, such as jurisdictional disputes and
the closed or agency-shop, does nothing to eradicate the root problem: the monopoly power itself.
"The notion that labor monopolies can be frustrated or mitigated merely by forbidding the closed
shop is, I submit, almost wholly ingenuous and mistaken." Simons, supra note 5, at 7 n.5. In this
regard, Milton Friedman is opposed, on libertarian grounds, to "right-to-work" laws, laws forbid-
ding the so-called "yellow dog" contract, and the existence of labor monopolies. See M. FRIED-
MAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 115-36 (1962) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN]. A different, but
not inconsistent, point is made by those who maintain that until the NLRA-which drastically
modified the common law to expand the legal rights and coercive powers of labor unions-is
repealed, "private" action pursuant to the NLRA implicates constitutional interests. See, e.g.,
Petro, supra note 4, at 505-08; HAGGARD, supra note 37, at 239-67. Cf. Pulliam, Union Security
Clauses in Public Sector Labor Contracts andAbood v. Detroit Board of Education: A Dissent, 31
LABOR LJ. 539 (1980) (distinguishing between private and public employers).
65. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
66. Id at 502.
67. Id at 503.
68. Id at 503-04.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol 13
THE RATIONALE FOR THE LABOR ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Samuel Gompers and the Philosophy of Trade Unionism
The philosophy of trade unionism, harkening back to the era of me-
dieval guilds, offers a two-fold justification for the disparate treatment
of monopolistic combinations of labor. The tenets of unionism presup-
pose that (1) human labor is a unique good that should not be treated
as an ordinary commodity, and (2) individual workers in modem in-
dustrial society are helpless and impotent unless they group together in
collective action.69 Even cursory scrutiny reveals that these two
claims-the theoretical foundation of unionism-are untenable and in-
compatible with the precepts of a free society. Yet Samuel Gompers,
founder of the American Federation of Labor, the dominant force in
the organized labor movement during the early twentieth century, es-
poused these beliefs throughout his public life and offered them to
Congress as arguments in favor of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton
Act.70
Gompers believed that monopolies of labor are different from mo-
nopolies of capital because "[l]abor power is a human attribute," which
reflects "the mystery of personality." Treating human labor the same
as other commodities is "revolting" and lays "the foundation for seri-
ous injustice."'" Not only, as will be seen later, is this construct insuffi-
cient to distinguish rationally between the labor of various
occupational groups (only some of which are exempt from the antitrust
laws), but it fails to state a principled basis for preferring wage-earners
as a group (regardless of income level) over, say, sole proprietors, indi-
vidual entrepreneurs, salaried executives, and corporate shareholders
(who are subject to the antitrust laws), or the consumer (who is injured
by monopolistic wage-fixing). Why is individual effort expended in the
management and investment of capital, or the successful combination
of capital and labor, morally or philosophically distinct from individ-
69. See 2 P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 171-205
(2d ed. 1975); GOMPERS, supra note 47, at 251-59; R. HARVEY, SAMUEL GOMPERS: CHAMPION OF
THE TOILING MASSES 54-69 (1935). See generally F. THORNE, SAMUEL GOMPERS: AMERICAN
STATESMAN (1957) [hereinafter cited as THORNE].
70. In his testimony at the House Judiciary Committee's hearings on the Clayton Act, Sa-
muel Gompers declared that labor organizations are the
associated effort as a voluntary organization of men to protect the only thing they pos-
sessed-the power to labor.
It is an outrage... to attempt to place in the same category a combination of men
engaged in the speculation and the control of the products of labor and the products of
soil on the one hand and the associations of men and women who own nothing but
themselves and undertake to control nothing but themselves and their power to work.
H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1914). This rhetoric is also evident throughout the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
71. GOMPERS, supra note 47 at 252..
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ual effort expended in employment? Why should we ignore modem
economic theory and pretend that the nebulous entity "labor" is not a
commodity whose monopolization is socially and economically harm-
ful? These questions highlight the intellectual vacuity of this aspect of
trade union dogma.
A simple example illustrates this point well. Suppose that several
entrepreneurs dominate a discrete market in City A. Whether the hy-
pothetical commodity or service is retail clothing, wholesale foodstuffs,
or tow-truck service is irrelevant; any product will suffice. Our exam-
ple, however, assumes that the owners of tow-truck companies in City
A collude to raise the price of a tow from the prevailing market rate of
$25 to an artifically high level of $50. So long as the demand for tows is
relatively inelastic and there is no "market entry" by competitors, the
increase in prices will result in a wealth transfer from consumers-in
this example distressed car owners-to the tow-truck owners. The pre-
cise beneficiary of the monopolistic price increase will depend on the
form of business ownership. If, for instance, the price-fixing companies
are sole proprietorships, the individual owners will receive the entire
benefit of the price increases. If the price-fixing companies are corpo-
rations, the shareholders will benefit from increased profits and, hence,
dividends. This economic benefit, however, is at the expense of the
consuming public. The Sherman Act, designed to prevent this type of
anticompetitive injury, proscribes the foregoing conduct as a conspir-
acy in restraint of trade, punishable as a felony and/or by imposition of
civil sanctions consisting of treble damages.
Suppose instead that the tow-truck drivers in City A collude to raise
the price of their labor and impair the efficiency of their employers'
enterprise (by reducing allowable hours, mandating rest breaks, requir-
ing expensive safety equipment, etc.). The drivers do this by forming a
union which acts as the exclusive bargaining agent for tow-truck driv-
ers. Suppose that the owners, in order to comply with the union's de-
mands, have to raise the price of a tow from $25 to $50 to maintain
existing profit levels. Assuming, again, that the demand for tows is rel-
atively inelastic and there is no "market entry" by nonunion competi-
tors, the consuming public suffers the same injury-higher prices--and
the same wealth is transferred to the monopolists-the drivers. In this
scenario, however, the Sherman Act is not violated. In fact, the drivers'
conduct is encouraged under the NLRA.
Because the price-fixing conspirators are wage-earners, the anticom-
petitive and injurious monopolistic agreement does not violate the law.
The same conduct by owners--either sole proprietors, shareholders, or
owner-operators-is an egregious violation of the law. Lawyers may
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not legally wage-fix, but their secretaries can. Doctors may not legally
wage-fix, but their nurses and other employees can. These distinctions
are, I submit, wholly irrational and indefensible.
Moreover, it is ironic that Gompers asserted the metaphysics of indi-
vidual identity in support of legislative immunities for union conduct
when the corollary to Gompers' advocacy of the collectivist principle-
of unionism itself-is contempt for the individual qua individual.
Gompers explained the raison d'etre of unionism in unmistakable
terms: "[O]nly by the unity of these individuals, the unity of the work-
ing people who have lost their single individuality, [can] they gain...
collective social importance."7 The "fundamental principle" of trade
unionism is the subordination of self for the common good. 3 Gompers
denied even the possibility of individual accomplishment:
The combined minds of all associated together in the industry, their
labor power, their cooperation and service are necessary to the suc-
cess of the undertaking. Is there a man so impervious to the molding
forces of the world in which he lives as to point to any one thing and
say, "I, alone, did that?". . . To ignore reality and to force upon the
toilers a concept of individual isolation...
attempts to deny the natural collective forces and conditions of the
world.74
The second prong of Gompers' philosophy is that the "natural" or
"iron" law of market principles is inappropriate in the determination of
wage or employment levels.75 Because wage competition among indi-
viduals is fallacious when employers are combinations of capital, col-
lective labor bargaining is essential.76 This justification for collective
72. THORNE, supra note 69, at 21 (quoting Gompers).
73. See THORNE, supra note 69, at 23.
74. THORNE, supra note 69, at 54-55 (quoting Gompers). Gomper's true feelings about com-
pulsion and voluntarism are revealed in his views on the open versus closed shop debate:
'Neither [organized labor nor employer] should be subject to the irresponsibility of the nonunion-
ist, or his failure to act in concert with... the unionist." Id at 35 (quoting Gompers).
75. See THORNE, supra note 69, at 44.
76. See THORNE, supra note 69, at 50-51. But cf Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public.
Sector Bargaining, 10 Wake Forest L. Rev. 25 (1974):
The case for compulsory collective bargaining in the private sector rested in the begin-
ning and rests yet on.. . the [exploded] theory that there is built into the market econ-
omy an inequality of bargaining power in favor of employers which only artificially
strengthened unionization and compulsory collective bargaining can remedy....
. .[E]very competent and disinterested economist who has studied collective bargain-
ing in operation has [concluded] that employer "monopsony" in the labor market is a
chimera with no substance at all.
Id at 58-59. See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); M. HoRwirz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 118-20 (1977);
Coase, The Nature ofthe Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (corporations are not "chartered monop-
olies" but private contractual relationships which are an efficient replacement for market transac-
tions). Even if it is conceded, arguendo, that labor ought to be able to form associations (unions)
to countervail the economic strength of assocations of capital (corporations), this argument still
does not justify the present scheme of collective bargaining under the NLRA. While there are
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bargaining and exclusive representation is premised on an analogy be-
tween combinations of labor, ie., unions, and combinations of capital,
Le., corporate employers. Because the law permits corporations to ex-
ist, the argument goes, workers must be allowed to pool their economic
strength in order to extract a fair price (or "distributive share") for their
labor. This argument fails because the analogy is fundamentally
flawed.
That the law permits individual investors to assume the legal status
of a corporation to conduct business is irrelevant because the corporate
form is not inherently monopsonistic and has no independent adverse
effect on competition. Consequently, the corporate form itself has
never been regarded as a combination or conspiracy in violation of the
antitrust laws. Horizontal combinations of buyers or sellers, however,
have enormous anti-competitive effects, and are proscribed for pre-
cisely this reason. If monopsony behavior among employers were per-
mitted, the proponents of "collective bargaining" among sellers, ie.,
the exercise of monopoly labor power, would have a plausible argu-
ment. But inasmuch as monopsony behavior isper se illegal under the
antitrust laws, the only economically sound characterization of combi-
nations of labor is that of unjustified, monopolistic cartels. The only
combinations of capital even remotely resembling a collective-bargain-
ing labor union are monopolies or price-fixing conspiracies, both of
which areper se illegal.
It is thus apparent that the commonly articulated justifications for
collective bargaining and exclusive representation are inadequate and
inconsistent with the paramount goals of our society-freedom and
competition.
B. Professional Associations and the Antitrust Laws. A Contrast
From a doctrinal perspective, the most interesting facet of the evolv-
ing antitrust-labor dialectic is the recent emergence of a gross incon-
gruity in the law. Since 1950 the Supreme Court has unwittingly
undermined the logical and legal basis of the Apex Hosiery decision
and the labor exemption in general by extending the antitrust laws to
"nonproletariat" labor organizations-professional associations.
obvious differences between labor and capital in this "analogy"--capital is fungible, but scarce;
labor is abundant, but highly variable in its suitability for the purchasers' needs-Professor
Michael Novak has identified the uniquely distinguishing feature of corporations: "[Tihe distinc-
tive social invention of democratic capitalism was not the individual but the voluntary association,
registered in law as the corporation." Novak, The Vision of Democratic Capitalism-PuBLlC OPIN-
ION (April-May 1981), at 6 (emphasis in original). Thus, the "inequality-of-bargaining-power"
argument can, at best, justify only voluntary associations of labor. The dominant feature of trade
unionism under the NLRA, in contrast, is compulsion and exclusivity of representation. See notes
26-28 and accompanying text supra.
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The common law did not view professional associations as combina-
tions in restraint of trade, notwithstanding the obvious anti-competitive
purpose and effect of these organizations. 7 Regrettably, this tolerance
survived the enactment of the Sherman Act. Hence, beginning with the
creation of the labor exemption in 1914, labor unions and professional
associations were treated identically under the federal antitrust laws;
the elimination of wage competition by these groups was permitted. In
1950, however, the Supreme Court held that organizations of real estate
brokers were not "labor organizations" and, therefore, that the brokers'
fee schedule violated the Sherman Act.78 More recently, the Supreme
Court has unanimously held that a bar association's minimum fee
schedule for legal services constitutes price-fixing under section 1 of the
Sherman Act7 9 and that an association of professional engineers' prohi-
bition of competitive bidding by its members violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act.8" We are left to guess why groups of physicians,8" real
estate brokers, lawyers, and engineers violate the antitrust laws when
they attempt to limit or eliminate wage competition for their services if,
as the Court stated in Apex Hosiery, the elimination of wage competi-
tion is "not the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by
the Sherman Act." Nor does Mr. Gompers' rhetoric resolve this di-
lemma: The labor of a doctor or lawyer is presumably just as unique as
any other worker's. Justice Robert H. Jackson perceived this critical
inconsistency--even more glaring now-in his lone dissent in United
77. Significantly, the counsel for the defendants in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.)
111 (1842), the leaders of the Journeymen Bootmakers Society, argued that the union leaders were
no more guilty of common law conspiracy than other organizations of workers seeking to price-fix
the cost of their services: "To show that association for the promotion, inevitably coercive, of
common interests is normal and proper, [defendants' counsel] called representatives of several
professional and commercial organizations" such as the Boston Bar Association and the Boston
Medical Association, which legally prescribed minimum fees and other anti-competitive practices.
Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1128, 1138 (1932).
78. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950); accord, Mc-
Clain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); People v. National Ass'n of Realtors, - Cal. App.
3d -, 174 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1981) (interpreting Cartwright Act). See also Note, The Professionalim
or Real Estate Brokerage and the Problem of Multiple Listing Service Exclusion: A Sherman Act
Analysis, 59 TEXAs L. REV. 125 (1980).
79. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
80. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Impor-
tantly, the Court rejected the engineer association's argument that bargaining between buyer and
seller of professional services is the same as competition between two or more potential sellers. Id
at 693 n.19. Thus, the process of collective bargaining between a union and an employer is not an
effective substitute for wage competition in the relevant potential labor pool.
81. See American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). See also Na-
tional Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 49 U.S.L.W.
4672 (June 15, 1981) (private health insurance companies are not statutorily immune from the
federal antitrust laws). Cf Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, [1980-1981] TRADE
CAsEs (CCH) 63,239 (9th Cir, 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1512 (1981) (foundations for medi-
cal care do not per se violate §1 of the Sherman Act by setting maximum fees for participating
physicians). See generally Craver, The Application of Labor andAntitrust Laws to Physician Un-
ions: The Need for a Re-Evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a Radically Changing Field, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 55 (1975).
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States v. NationalAssociation of Real Estate Boards. His classic words
ring true 30 years later:
If real estate brokerage is to be distinguished from the professions
or from other labor that is permitted to organize, the Court does not
impart any standards for so doing.
I suppose [the antitrust] immunity is not confined to those
whose labor is manual, and is not lost because the labor performed is
professional. . . . I am not persuaded that fixing uniform fees for
the broker's labor is more offensive to the antitrust laws than fixing
uniform fees for the labor of. . .a carpenter, or a plumber.82
The purpose of pointing out the inexplicably disparate treatment of
labor unions and professional organizations under the antitrust laws is
82. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, 496 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
In H.A. Artists & Associations, Inc. v. Actors'EquityAss'n, 49 U.S.L.W. 4557 (May 26, 1981), the
Court stated that "[o]f course, a party seeking refuge in the statutory [antitrust] exemption must be
a bona fide labor organization, and not an independent contractor or entrepreneur." Id at 4560
n.20. The precise rationale for this distinction is elusive. The "entrepreneurs" and "businessmen"
in Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962) and Colum-
bia Rivers PackingAss'n Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942), the authorities cited for this proposi-
tion in Actors' Equity, were, respectively, self-employed dealers in waste kitchen grease and self-
employed fishermen. The grease peddlers and fishermen in each case sought to limit or eliminate
price competition for their services and joined or created unions to accomplish this purpose. The
Court in each case held that the workers-who combined difficult physical labor with en-
trepreneurial skill and did not seem to be significantly aligned with the bourgeoisie-were not
covered by the labor antitrust exemption because they were not "employees" or wage-earners.
See, 371 U.S. at 98-103 (begging the question by talismanically calling the grease peddlers "busi-
nessmen"); 315 U.S. at 145-47 (the distinction between the sale of pure labor in an employment
relationship and the sale of a mixture of labor and entrepreneurial skill--e., the sale of a "corn-
modity"-"calls for no extended discussion"). But compare International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 289-94 (1959) (master collective bargaining asreement
regulating rates charged by independent, ie., non-employee, owner-operators of truck in interstate
commerce does not violate Ohio's antitrust law because such regulation relates to "wage" compo-
nent), with id at 297-98 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (owner-operators are independent contractors
whose "wages" are not divisible; regulation of rates should violate Ohio's antitrust law). See also
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947) ("These driver-owners are small businessmen.
They own their own trucks."). As the tow truck price-fixing example cited earlier in this article
illustrates, the distinction between "employees" and entrepreneurs, a characterization that leads to
enormously disparate legal effects under the antitrust exemption, is an illogical one. To the (very
great) extent that the characterization turns on non-worker ownership of the "means of produc-
tion," it is also one grounded ultimately in Marxian-syndicalist ideology. (One wonders how the
Court would apply the Actors' Equity "test" to collective bargaining units at companies such as
Rath Packing Co., ownedby the workers through an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). See
"When Employees Take Over," Newsweek, June 1, 1981, at 74. Would union workers in ESOP-
owned enterprises be regarded as "employees" or "entrepreneurs?" How would such worker-
owners be distinguished from the self-employed fishermen in Columbia River PackersAss'n or the
tow truck owner-operators in the hypothetical?)
If the Court were more forthright m its articulation of the basis for the employee-entrepreneur
distinction under the statutory and non-statutory labor antitrust exemptions, see Connell Con-
struction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975), the American public
would undoubtedly be more likely to seek their legislative repeal. There is, however, little reason
to suppose that such candor-at least in the labor law area-is forthcoming. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 145 (1937) (the NLRA is not unconstitutional as a
violation of due process because §9(a)'s provision of exclusive representation does not "preclud[e]
such individual [employment] contracts" as the Company might "elect to make directly with indi-
vidual employees," quoting Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 559
(1937)). Cf. Petro, supra note 4; note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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not to suggest that the labor exemption ought to be extended to doctors,
lawyers, and other groups. The purveyors of professional services, like
the sellers of manufactured goods and all other commodities, (includ-
ing "ordinary" labor) should compete without artificial advantage in
the market."3 The point is that any doctrinal or logical credibility the
labor exemption once had-and indeed the doctrine has always been
indefensible on economic grounds-has been eroded.
The labor exemption stands today as a stark and ignoble example of
special interest legislation that benefits the monopoly unions at the ex-
pense of the non-union workforce and the consumer. When President
Reagan proposed that the labor exemption be repealed-necessitating
the abrogation of those provisions of the NLRA which, inter alia, pro-
vide for exclusive representation and compulsory collective bargain-
ing-he was merely advocating an even-handed application of the
antitrust laws, and was echoing the sentiments of such scholars as the
late Dean.Roscoe Pound 4 and Professors Edward Banfield,8s Milton
Friedman,86 Friedrich Hayek,87 and Henry Simons.8s Even Dean
George Schatzki, hardly an opponent of labor organizations, has sug-
gested the abolition of the doctrine of exclusive representation. 9
83. As Ayn Rand pungently demonstrates in her epicAtlas Shrugged, the "anti-dog-eat-dog"
principle finds application in all contexts where competition produces winners and losers, ie., in
all competitive endeavors. Thus, men-whether laborers or businessmen-who are afraid to com-
pete prospectively, for fear of failure, will attempt to restrict the process of competition. The
National Alliance of Railroads, Ms. Rand's fictional-though deadly accurate--organization, il-
lustrates the psychology of cartel behavior.
'Members of the same profession or of the same industry should stick together,' the or-
ganizers of the Alliance had said. 'We all have the same problems, the same interests,
e same enemies. We waste our energy fighting one another, instead of presenting a
common front to the world. We can all grow and prosper together, if we pool our ef-
forts.' 'Against whom is this Alliance being organized?' a skeptic had asked. The answer
had been: 'Why, it's not "against" anybody. But ifyou want to put it that way, why, it's
against shippers or supply manufacturers or anyone who might try to take advantage of
us. Against whom is any union organized?' 'That's what I wonder about,' the skeptic
had said.
A. RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 76 (1957).
84. Pound, Legal Immunities fLabor Unions, in LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 122
(Am. Enterprise Ass'n ed. 1958).
85. See BANFIELD, supra note 33 at 245.
86. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 64, at 132.
87. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 267-84 (1960).
88. See Simons, supra note 5. The late Professor Henry C. Simons' article remains the classic
exposition of the economic, social, and political costs of monopoly union power.
No one and no group can be trusted with [monopoly] power, and it is merely silly to
complain because groups exercise power selfishly. The mistake lies simply in permitting
them to have it. Monopoly power must be abused. It has no use save abuse.
Id at 6. See notes 29 supra and 93 infra.
89. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual
Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 918-26 (1975). See also
Petro, supra note 4, at 510; HAGGARD, supra note 37, at 279-82; Shaffer, Some Alternatives to
Existing Labor Policies, 27 LABOR LJ. 370 (1976).
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CONCLUSION
A small and steadily decreasing portion of the American labor-
force-currently 20 percent-belongs to labor unions.90 Inasmuch as
unions have "not only harmed the public at large and workers as a
whole by distorting the use of labor," but "have also made the incomes
of the working class more unequal by reducing the opportunities avail-
able to the most disadvantaged workers,"'" it is ironic that opponents
of monopoly unions are excoriated as "anti-worker" or "anti-labor.
' '92
Favoring application of the antitrust laws to union cartels is not even
being anti-union; it is merely being anti-monopoly.93 As one percipient
commentator has pointed out:
[M]en have a right to organize into unions, provided they do so vol-
untarily, that is, provided no one is forced to join .... [L]egislation
has forced men to join unions, whether they wished to or not, and
forced employers to deal with these unions, whether they wished to
or not .... Non-unionized workers, and the rest of the population
generally, .. are made to subsidize the unjustifiably high wages of
union workers.94
Milton and Rose Friedman add-
Labor unions can and often do provide useful services for their mem-
bers-negotiating the terms of their employment, representing them
with respect to grievances, giving them a feeling of belonging and
participating in a group activity, among others. As believers in free-
dom, we favor the fullest opportunity for voluntary organization of
labor unions to perform whatever services their members wish, and
are willing to pay for, provided they respect the right of others and
refrain from usingforce.
However, unions and comparable groups: . . have succeeded in
getting government to grant them special privileges and immunities,
which have enabled them to benefit some of their members and offi-
90. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, table 704, at 427 (100 ed. 1979). Even while union membership has steadily
declined, in relative terms, the number of NLRB. complaints against employers has increased, just
as steadily. See Mills, Flawed Victory in Labor Law Reorm, 57 HARV. BUS. REV. 92, 96 (1979).
91. FRIEDMAN, supra note 64, at 124.
92. See note 5 supra. It is important to recognize the dichotomy between the interests of
union and worker. For a revealing account of how one union-the United Farm Workers-suc-
ceeded in imposing "organization' on unwilling workers, stripping them of their associational
rights, and actually lowering their standard of living, see R. DE TOLEDANO, LITTLE CESAR (1971).
93. To entertain doubt about unionism is no more. . . 'anti-labor' or 'anti-working
class' than to attack business cartels is to imply that one is anti-private enterprise or a
communist. To be anti-monopoly, to distrust all concentrations of power of whatever
origin or orientation, is simply to understand the unavoidable reality of Henry Simons'
timeless observation that 'a community which fails to preserve the discipline of competi-
tion exposes itself to the discipline of absolute authority.'
Burton, Some Further R,!efeions on Syndicalism, I GOV'T UNION REV. 42, 55 (1980).
94. Branden, The Role of Labor Unions, in A. RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL
85, 87 (1967).
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cials at the expense of other workers and all consumers.
95
In addition to causing unemployment and higher consumer prices,
the elimination of wage competition inherent in collective bargaining,
and the concomitant wage spiral in heavily unionized industries (espe-
cially labor-intensive, monolithic enterprises), have gravely impaired
the vitality of America's industrial base. The artificially and uncompe-
titively high cost of labor in the basic manufacturing industries-par-
ticularly steel and automobile production-is at least partially
responsible for the inability of those industries to hold their own in the
world market. Unionized American steelworkers are paid (wages and
benefits combined) an average of $18.90 an hour,9 6 while their weakly
unionized,97 competing Japanese counterparts receive an average $9.20
per hour (again, wages and benefits combined).98 The overpayment of
monopoly union labor is "one big reason Japanese companies can pro-
duce a ton of steel for $70 less than American steelmakers." '99 Simi-
larly, U.S. auto workers collect about $19 an hour in wages and benefits
while auto workers in Japan earn only slightly more than $10 an hour
in wages and benefits.1° The artifically high wage package enjoyed by
American auto workers, reflected in the price of American cars, was an
important factor in the rising popularity-and market share-of small
imported cars during the 1970's.101 The average Japanese car is $1,800
cheaper than its American counterpart and, Transportation Secretary
Drew Lewis has said, "a very significant part of that is labor cost."'10 2
95. FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 242-43 (emphasis added).
96. "Big Steel Gets Some Big Promises," Newsweek, Oct. 13, 1980, at 90.
97. Drucker, Behind Japan's Success, 59 HARV. Bus. REV. 83, 84 (1981).
98. "Big Steel Gets Some Big Promises," Newsweek, Oct. 13, 1980, at 90.
99. Id Henry Simons noted, in this vein, that "[i]f I were running a union and were manag-
ing it faithfully in the interest of the majority of its numbers, .. . I should plan gradually to
exterminate the industry by excessive labor costs" which impair capital investment and product
competition. Simons, supra note 5, at 8. See L. von Mises, Wages, Unemployment and Inflation,
in PLANNING FOR FREEDOM 150-60 (2d ed. 1965).
100. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1980, §V, at 3, col. 2. "[D]espite their widely publicized
fringe benefits, including company-subsidized housing for those who want it, fringe benefits [for
Japanese auto workers] are estimated at only $2 an hour." Id In contrast, the United Auto
Workers' health benefits alone cost General Motors over $200 for every car produced. See Re-
marks of Sen. Edward Kennedy, "The Economic Impact of Health Care Legislation," The Na-
tional Underwriter, March 26, 1976, at 11-12. It is not insignificant that many Japanese
automobile and motorcycle manufacturers who have built plants in the United States have, to
their credit, resisted-for the most part successfully-UAW organizing attempts. See Wall St. J.,
Aug. 26, 1980, at 35, col. 4. Moreover, the disparity in wages between Japanese and American
workers is not because Japanese workers are underpaid; to the contrary, labor relations in Japan
are very harmonious. "'It isn't that Japanese steelworkers are underpaid,' one Japanese steel
official says. 'It's that American steelworkers are overpaid. Our wages are higher than any other
nation's except the United States.'" Wall St. J., April 7, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
101. See Tucker, "The Wreck of the Auto Industry," Harper's, Nov. 1980, at 49. A recent
Department of Transportation report, ordered by Congress as part of the $1.5 billion Chrysler
loan guarantee, concluded that lower labor costs and higher worker productivity enable Japanese
auto makers to produce cars for an average $1,000 to $1,500 less than American manufacturers.
See Los Angeles Times, Jan. 14, 1981, §1, at I, col. 1.
102. Los Angeles Times, March 7, 1981, §1, at 16, col. 1.
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Is it any wonder that American auto and steel makers cannot com-
pete successfully with global industry? But instead of resisting the
wage demands of monopoly unions, these industries join the unions in
seeking protection from foreign competition in the form of import quo-
tas, tariffs, and so-called "anti-dumping" laws° 3-all to the detriment
of the American consumer." "Limiting imports," Nobel laureate
Milton Friedman instructs:
[d]enies the consumer the opportunity to buy products that he or she
regards as the best buy for the money and forces the consumer to buy
more expensive or less desirable products. In addition, it removes
the pressure of competition on enterprises to be efficient and
strengthens private monopoly, which will have a long-lasting effect
on the productivity of the economy. Foreign competition under-
mines monopoly far more effectively than antitrust actions by the
FTC or the Justice Department.
• ..As Adam Smith wrote more than two centuries ago, "In every
country, it always is and must be the interest of a great body of the
people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The
proposition is so very manifesf, that it seems ridiculous to take any
pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called into question,
had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers
[and today, trade unions and government bureaucrats] confounded
the common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in this respect, di-
rectly opposite to that of the great body of the people."'10 5
When one looks at American wage data, including wage contracts re-
sulting in a 20 percent increase in the labor costs of the major U.S. auto
makers this year, one is forced to agree with this prognosis:
No one can be insensitive to [the almost 200,000] unemployed auto
workers, and the outlook may be worse than even some of the
gloomy forecasts. Something needs to be done, but not import re-
strictions. When the UAW and Ford Lobbyists come pleading to the
White House and Congress, they ought to receive a simple message.
Go home. Renegotiate your crazy [labor] contract. Get yourselves
103. The tremendous pressure exerted by the UAW and the American auto makers to have
legislative import quotas imposed prompted the "compromise" measure of "voluntary" two-year
restraints by the Japanese. See Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1981, §1, at 1, col. 5. See generally
"Detroit's Fall of Discontent," Newsweek, Nov. 10, 1980, at 87; Los Angeles Times, Nov. 11, 1980,
at §1, at 1, col. 5; Oct. 10, 1980, §1, at 14, col. 1; Oct. 9, 1980, §1, at 17, col. 1.
104. The economic costs of protectionism, Le., higher consumer prices, inefficiency, and a
wealth transfer to the protected industry, have been empirically demonstrated to exceed its bene-
fits, ie., domestic economic displacement. See generally M. MORKRE & D. TARR, EFFECTS OF
RESTRICTIONS ON UNITED STATES IMPORTS: FIVE CASE STUDIES AND THEORY (1980).
105. Friedman, "Do Imports Cost Jobs?," Newsweek, Feb. 9, 1981, at 77. Accord, Tucker,
"Kill the Umpire: Adam Smith versus Business," Harper's, Feb. 1981, at 84. See also Friedman,
"Autos and Import Curbs," Newsweek, March 16, 1981, at 84; Friedman, "'Voluntary' Restric-
tions," Newsweek, April 6, 1981, at 81.
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out of this mess.' 0 6
Whatever justification labor cartels may have enjoyed in the mytho-
logical era of monopsonistic and oligopsonistic industrial combinations
that is thought to have prevailed prior to the passage of the Sherman
Act in 1890,107 these conditions no longer exist and, more saliently (for
106. Samuelson, Japan's Not to Blame/or U.S. Car Mess, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 17, 1980,
§11, at 7, col. I.
An unusual but telling consensus emerged in opposition to import quotas on Japanese
automobiles. The liberal syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft, editors of the Los Angeles Times,
and New Republic editor Michael Kinsley have, remarkably, joined conservative National Journal
columnist Robert Samuelson, former Federal Reserve Board chairman Arthur Burns, and Dr.
Milton Friedman in opposing auto import quotas. See Kraft, Assembly-Line Inflation: Reagan
Will Miss His Chance, Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1981, §11, at 7, col. 1; Editorial, The Auto
Workers' Stake, Los Angeles Times, March 9, 1981, §11, at 4, col. 1; Editorial, QuotasAre Quotas,
Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1981, §11, at 6, col. 1; Editorial, Not Bloody Likely, Los Angeles
Times, April 8, 1981, §11, at 6, col. 1; Kinsley, Japanese Auto Imports Test Reagan's Capitalism,
Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1981, §V, at 3, col. I; Samuelson, supra; Samuelson, Politicians
Shouldn't Offer Easy Way Out for Detroit, Los Angeles Times, March 3, 1981, §11, at 5, col. 1;
Friedman, "Do Imports Cost Jobs?," Newsweek, Feb. 9, 1981, at 77.
Even more remarkable is the almost unanimous recognition by the liberal bloc that excessive
labor costs are at least partially to blame for the current plight of American auto manufacturers.
Michael Kinsley, for instance, writes:
An indirect inflationary effect of auto import restrictions will be to protect high wages in
the automobile industry. . . . [T]he typical auto worker today is better off than the typi-
cal American auto buyer. . . . Government policies that artificially raise car prices to
protect auto-worker wages, therefore, represent a net transfer from less affluent people to
more affluent people. Such policies, including trade barriers, are not even progressive,
let alone sensible.
Kinsley, supra. Joseph Kraft opines that immoderate "wage bargainings combine with more gen-
eral conditions to explain why Chrysler is on the edge of bankruptcy. . . . IT]he union ought to
be showing restraint on the wages at Ford and General Motors." Kraft, supra. A Los Angeles
Times editorial notes:
Unit labor costs account for two-thirds of all [American auto production] costs. . . .In
the U.S. auto industry, hourly labor costs are now 60% higher than the average for all
manufacturing. When foreign competition was minimal or considered unimportant, the
auto companies went along with steadily soaring union wage and benefit demands, se-
cure in the knowledge that the added costs could be passed on to, and swallowed by,
consumers. By the time the companies woke up to the reality of foreign competition,
they were stuck with staggering labor costs.
Editorial, QuotasAre Quotas, Los Angeles Times, March 25, 1981, §11, at 6, col. I
The only effective solution to excessive labor costs arising from the present scheme of collective
"bargaining," of course, is not management seeking "wage concessions" from labor unions, or the
federal government pressuring companies and unions to strike some "reasonable" compromise,
but the elimination of monopoly union power in the auto industry and elsewhere. Not until there
is free wage competition among auto workers will the excessively high wage levels come down to a
normal, market rate. See notes 69, 88 & 99 supra. The present scheme of collective bargaining, in
other words, needs to be dismantled and abolished. Most industry productivity ills are directly
attributable to union-negotiated excessive labor costs and inefficient contract clauses. The mala-
dies plaguing the auto industry are endemic to labor-intensive businesses dominated by strong
unions. As General Motors chairman Roger Smith recently observed, American companies,
workers, and voters are going to have to realize that import quotas and other protectionist meas-
ures are not a solution to domestic industrial woes. Wages must come down in order to be com-
petitive with foreign markets. "Nobody has repealed the law of economics." See Los Angeles
Times, April 26, 1981, §V, at 3, col. 2. "Some basic changes in our wage structure must occur,"
Smith has said. Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1981, §111, at 16, col. I. This does not mean that
unions must be abolished, only that they must become voluntary, and their role in wage-negotia-
tion must become non-exclusive. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text supra.
107. But see T.S. Ashton, The Standard ofLfe f/the Workers in England, 1790-1830, in CAPI-
TALISM AND THE HIsToRIANS 123 (F. Hayek, ed. 1954); W. H. Hutt, The Factory System of the
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the NLRA is not merely anachronistic, °8 it is and always has been
specious), did not exist when the NLRA was enacted in 1935. Section 1
of the Wagner Act'° 9-the "Findings and Declaration of Policy" of the
NLRA-presumes that compulsory collective bargaining by exclusive
representative unions is necessary to maintain economic efficiency, sta-
bilize competitive wage rates, encourage practices "fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes," and "restore equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees." This assertion
of policy is not only demonstrably erroneous, but is such a grotesque
perversion of reality and semantics that it can aptly be characterized as
a Big Lie.
The principles and. precepts of laissez-faire market competition
which undergird our economic system and are embodied in the Sher-
man Act-which, in Justice Hugo Black's words, "was designed to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade'"' -betray the patent
falsity of the major (and essential) premises of the NLRA. The Sher-
man Act's proscription of monopolistic economic combinations re-
quires that all cartels and price-fixing conspiracies-whether business
or labor-be dismantled."' Surely the utility of governmentally-en-
forced market competition--"the heart of our national economic pol-
icy""III---does not depend (to adapt a metaphor) on whose trust is being
busted.
Whatever the capacity for good labor unions possess, they must be
subject to the same rules of law that govern other groups. No other
private organization can legally compel unwilling persons to pay mem-
bership or "agency" fees as a condition of employment, to be exclu-
sively represented in their contractual dealings with potential
purchasers of their services, and to be bound by the terms of a collec-
tive "agreement" they may abhor. No other private organization can
legally conspire to fix the price of its product or to compel unwilling
parties to deal with it and transact business on its terms under the
threat of group boycott and concerted economic reprisal (not to men-
Early Nineteenth Century, in id. at 156 (concluding that the standard of living of the working
classes improved, for the most part, under the British factory system of the nineteenth century).
108. Cf. Schrank, Are Unions an Anachronism?, 57 HARV. Bus. REv. 107 (1979) (a former
union official and organizer argues, convincingly, that changes in industrial conditions and the
composition of the workforce since the 1930's have rendered the traditional labor movement obso-
lete).
109. 29 U.S.C. §151 (1976).
110. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
111. See R. BORI, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX 50-71 (1978); Bork, Legislative Intent and the
Policy ofthe ShermanAct, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7, 11 (1966) (legislative intent of the Sherman Act
was to maximize consumer welfare).
112. Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951).
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tion picket line violence).1 3 In short, labor unions have acquired a
unique and intolerable array of legal privileges-manifested most dra-
matically by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts' antitrust exemp-
tion and the NLRA doctrines of compulsory collective bargaining and
exclusive representation.
For all the reasons outlined in this article, the era in which unions
are treated as uniquely privileged institutions to which the general rules
of law do not apply must come to an end. The coercion, violence,"
t4
corruption, 1 5 economic waste, unemployment, undemocratic distor-
tion of our political system,' 1 6 and staggering concentrations of eco-
nomic power"17 generated as necessary consequences of monopoly
113. See note 114 infra.
114. See generally S. PETRO, THE KOHLER STRIKE (1961); S. PETRO, THE KINOSPORT STRIKE
(1967); S. PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY 189-201 (1957); Haggard, Labor
Violence: The Inadequate Response of the Federal Anti-Extortion Statutes, 59 NEB. L. REv. 859
(1980); Haggard, Picket Line Observance as a Protected Concerted Activity, 53 N.C. L. REV. 43
(1974). See also Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1981).
115. See generally S. BRILL, THE TEAMSTERS (1978); J. FINLEY, THE CORRUPT KINGDOM
(1972); H. JOHNSON & N. KOTz, THE UNIONS (1972) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON & KoTz]. D.
MOLDEA, THE HOFFA WARS: TEAMSTERS, REBELS, POLITICIANS, AND THE MOB (1978); S. PETRO,
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Worse Than Ever," U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 8, 1980, at 33-36.
116. Labor unions spent $8.1 million in the 1976 congressional races and a record $14 million
in 1978. See M. GREEN & M. CALABRESE, WHO RUNS CONGRESS? 5 (3d ed. 1979); HATCH,
Labor: Promoting Freedom in the Workplace, in A CHANGING AMERICA 57 (P. Laxalt & R. Wil-
liamson eds. 1980). Due largely to union contributions, the Democratic Party candidates nor-
mally outspend their Republican opponents in election campaigns. "A New Prospect in
Congress," Newsweek, Nov. 3, 1980, at 46. In addition to direct monetary contributions--often
financed by employees' compelled union dues, assessments, or "agency fees' -unions contribute a
far larger amount of non-cash or "in-kind" partisan political support, ie., staff support, printing
and mailing costs, telephone banks, etc. See D. CADDY, THE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR PAY-
OFF (2d ed. 1976). "Without the power of union money, manpower and know-how ... the Dem-
ocratic Party today would come close to being impotent," reports Pulitzer Prize winners Haynes
Johnson and Nick Kotz. JOHNSON & KoTz, supra note 115, at 73. See note 2 supra. What ren-
ders union political activity suspect is not its scope-for corporations, wealthy individuals, and
business PAC's are free, within limits, to participate also-but its source. Partisan political activ-
ity subsidized by compelled "agency fees," involuntary assessments of any sort, and monopoly
over-charges is inherently undemocratic. This is not to suggest, however, that citizens should not
be concerned about the increasingly shrill and radical rhetoric espoused by union leaders. AFL-
CIO president Lane Kirkland has, for instance, already expressed his interest in having the union
"take a direct role in picking the next Democratic presidential nominee." Los Angeles Times,
Feb. 3, 1981, §1, at 20, col. 1. This would presumably represent a move toward fulfilling Kirk-
land's ambition "to make the Democratic Party 'labor's party.'" See Id., Feb. 19, 1981, §1, at 14,
col. 1. Big Labor has already targeted for defeat the members of the Conservative Democratic
Forum, whose support facilitated President Reagan's budget victory. See id. March 17, 1981, §1,
at 10, col. 5.
117. See P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO
AMERICA (1976); Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1981, §1, at 1, col. 1.
Nationwide, there is an estimated $600 billion in pension funds and the rate of growth is
about 11% a year. These funds are by far the biggest single source of capital in the
United States and by 1985 they are expected to own nearly half the corporate stock in
this country.
Id. It is just a matter of time before unions begin in earnest to manipulate these enormous pen-
sion funds to advance their dubious social and political goals. See Raskin, "Pension Funds Could
Be the Unions' Secret Weapon," Fortune, Dec. 31, 1979, at 17. Already, for example, an AFL-
CIO vice-president has recommended "withholding pension fund investments from companies
hostile to workers' rights." Los Angles Times, March 16, 1981, §1, at 24, col. 1. "The United Auto
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union power can be tolerated no longer. "The mere withdrawal of the
special privileges either explicitly granted to the unions or arrogated by
them with the toleration of the courts would seem enough to deprive
them of the more serious coercive powers which they now exercise and
to channel their legitimate selfish interests so that they would be so-
cially beneficial.""18
President Reagan, Senate Labor Committee chairman Orrin Hatch,
and the Republican congressional leadership' 19 will, one hopes, seize
the initiative and withdraw the special privileges that have been abused
by monopoly unions for over 60 years.' 20
Workers has warned 13 major U.S. corporations they may be cut out of all investment money
from the Chrysler-UAW Pension Fund because of their roles in South Africa's 'racist and un-
democratic political and economic practices.'" Id. Pension managers in California have pro-
posed agitating against firms deemed guilty of "social injury," which includes environmental
pollution, the use of nuclear energy, and arms sales. Id., March 23, 1981, §IV, at 1, col. 4. In light
of unions' avowed opposition to American aid to El Salvador, see id., Feb. 18, 1981, §1, at 5, col. 1,
growing involvement in the anti-nuclear movement, see id., Oct. 31, 1980, §11, at 7, col. 1, and
commitment to increased governmental intervention in the economy, see id., Feb. 20, 1981, §1, at
6, col. 1, the consuming public ought to be wary of unions' conception of what constitutes "social
injury."
I emphasize, again, that while investors in private companies should have the prerogative to
make or withhold investments based on the companies' policies and politics, the objection to
union pension investments lies in the source of the funds. Pension funds "negotiated" in collective
"bargaining agreements" have, this article posits, been extorted under the threat of economic and
physical duress. Benefits obtained through monopolistic conduct and conspiracies in restraint of
trade are not legitimate venture capital and should not be treated as such. See Haggard, Legal
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